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THE ACTIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:
IS THERE HARM IN AN ALJ ASKING?
Professor Allen E. Shoenberger*
Administrative Law Judges occupy a difficult judicial position
in American Law because of the multitude of responsibilities assigned,
responsibilities that are sometimes more extensive than ordinary trial
judges. The typical image of an American trial judge is that of an
impartial umpire, calling balls and strikes, but otherwise not
participating in playing the game. Reliance is placed upon opposing
counsel to bring out the facts and the law. While there are some
courtrooms where such passive judging is not the norm, litigants and
attorneys primarily expect the judge to be relatively passive in our
adversarial system of justice.'
Such passive "luxury" is often denied to ALJs, sometimes by
statutory command. For example, federal ALJs have an explicit
responsibility in social security cases to conduct the administrative
hearing in a manner designed to elicit all pertinent information
regarding the claimant's disability. 2 Such duty is particularly acute
when the claimant is unrepresented by counsel, for the ALJ then has a
higher duty to probe "scrupulously and conscientiously" into all
relevant facts so that such facts become a part of the record.3
However, many state ALJs in particular are not so explicitly
'Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago.
Contrast this with the inquisitorial style of justice prevalent in civil law
jurisdictions.
2 See, 42 U.S.C.§ 423(d)(5)(B); 20 C.F.R.§§ 404.1512(d) & 20 C.F.R. §416.912 (d)
("We will develop your complete medical history .... We will make every reasonable effort
to help you get medical records." ), and 20 C.F.R. §410.640. ("If the Administrative Law
Judge believes that there is relevant and material evidence available which has not been
presented at the hearing, the Administrative Law Judge may adjourn the hearing or, at any time
.. reopen the hearing for the receipt of such evidence.") See, Key v. Heckler, 754 F.2d 1545,
1550-51 (9th Cir. 1985); Smith v. Secretary of Health, Educ. and Welfare, 587 F.2d 857, 860
(7th Cir. 1978).
3 Cannon v. Harris, 651 F.2nd 513, 519 (7th Cir. 1981). (Internal quotation marks
and citations omitted.)
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directed to ensure that the record is complete.4 Thus authority to
question is not as clear. Indeed, in contrast to federal social security
hearings in which the government is not represented before the ALJ by
a lawyer, many administrative hearings both state and federal involve
lawyers representing a government agency on the one side, and on the
other side, an individual or business entity which may or may not be
represented by a lawyer. It is common in cases in which a lawyer
appears for a party before an ALJ for the lawyer to object to questioning
by the ALJ, frequently accompanied by a suggestion that by active
questioning the ALJ has shed her garb of impartiality and taken an
active role on one side or the other of the dispute.
This article analyzes the existent authority on the limits of ALJ
questioning and closely related conduct and suggests that reported
authority strongly supports ALJ "activism," so long as appropriate
decorum is preserved. In short, it appears that the decision of an ALJ
is unlikely to be overturned simply because of over vigorous
questioning by the ALJ.
At a constitutional level due process guarantees apply. Such
guarantees may be violated when the hearing officer presents the case
for one party, cross-examines the witnesses of the other party, and then
decides the case, although this is a fairly accurate description of the
functions of a social security AL. 5  The basic requirement of
constitutional due process is a fair and impartial tribunal, whether at the
hands of a court, an administrative agency or a government hearing
officer. Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982), Ward v.
Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972), Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S.
510 (1927).6
4 Of course some state ALJs have similar responsibilities explicitly provided for in
state law. See, Claim of Boudreau, 677 N.Y.S.2d 407, 408 (N.Y.A.D. 1998) ("The ALJ was
charged to 'conduct the hearing in such order and manner and with such methods of proof and
interrogation as the judge deems best suited to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties'
(12 NYCRR 461.4 [a])." Accord, Claim of O'Connor, 165 A.D.2d 946, 948, 561 N.Y.S.2d
318, 320 (N.Y.A.D. 1990); Allison v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Com'n, 716 A.2d 689,
692 (Pa.Cmwlth, 1998) (alleged quasi-prosecutorial questioning permitted as authorized by
statute).
5 1 F. Cooper, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 336, 340 (1965), Figueroa Ruiz v.
Delgado, 359 F.2d 718 (1st Cir. 1966), see Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 45-46
(1950), Burhoe v. Whaland, 116 N.H. 222, 356 A.2d 658 (1976).
6 Contrast, Police Com'r of Boston v. Municipal Court of the W. Roxbury Dist., 368
Mass. 501, 507, 332 N.E.2d 901 (1975) (hearing officer not disinterested where counsel
represented his wife in acrimonious divorce proceedings).
Decision makers are constitutionally unacceptable: 1) where the
decision maker has a direct personal, substantial, and pecuniary interest
in the outcome of the case;7 2) where an adjudicator has been the target
of personal abuse or criticisms from the party before him; and 3) when
a judicial or quasi-judicial decision maker has the dual role of
investigating and adjudicating disputes and complaints. However, a
person challenging the impartiality of a decision maker faces two
presumptions: 1) the strong presumption of honesty and integrity of the
adjudicators; and 2) the strong presumption that those making decisions
affecting the public are doing so in the public interest.'
Moreover, any appraisal of the situation must be made "under
a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weaknesses
... ." Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975). The existence of
partiality is not demonstrated by a hearing officer having a conviction
rate of 99.5 percent, or that the officer had formerly served as a
corrections officer.9 Nor is "Bias... conclusively established merely
because an ALJ uniformly credits one party's witnesses over
another's." ° Indeed, as the Supreme Court has stated:
The judge who presides at a trial may, upon completion
of the evidence, be exceedingly ill disposed towards the
defendant, who has been shown to be a thoroughly
reprehensible person. But the judge is not thereby recusable for
bias or prejudice, since his knowledge and the opinion it
produced were properly and necessarily acquired in the course
of the proceedings, and are indeed sometimes (as in a bench
trial) necessary to completion of the judge's task. As Judge
Jerome Frank pithily put it: "Impartiality is not gullibility.
Disinterestedness does not mean child-like innocence. If the
judge did not form judgments of the actors in those court-
house dramas called trials, he could never render decisions." In
re J.P.Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 654 (CA2 1943). Also not
7 Even an indirect pecuniary interest while on a temporary leave of absence may
disqualify a hearing officer. Deretich v. Office of Administrative Hearings, State of Minn., 798
F.2d 1147, 1152 (8th Cir.1986).
8 Valley v. Rapides Parish School Board, 118 F.3d 1047, 1052-3 (5th Cir. 1997).
9 Sales v. Murray, 862 F.Supp. 1511 (W.D.Va. 1994).
1o NLRB v. Berger Transfer & Storage Co., 678 F.2d 679, 687 (7th Cir. 1982).
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subject to deprecatory characterization as "bias" or "prejudice"
are opinions held by judges as a result of what they learned in
earlier proceedings. It has long been regarded as normal and
proper for a judge to sit in the same case upon its remand, and
to sit in successive trials involving the same defendant.
Thus, judicial remarks during the course of a trial that
are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the
parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or
partiality challenge. . . . Not establishing bias or partiality,
however, are expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction,
annoyance, and even anger, that are within the bounds of
imperfect men and women, even after having been confirmed
as federal judges, sometimes display. A judge's ordinary efforts
at courtroom administration--even a stem and short-tempered
judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom administration--remain
immune. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 551, 555-56
(1994).
Moreover, "[J]udicial remarks ... ordinarily do not support a
bias or partiality challenge ... [unless, for example,] they reveal such a
high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment
impossible." Baldwin Hardware Corp. v. Franksu Enter. Corp., 78 F.3d
550, 557 (Fed.Cir.1996)." "[A]n A.L.J. possesses wide latitude in the
conduct of the hearings before him regarding direct and cross-
examination, the handling of objections, and arguments of counsel."' 2
Conversely, complementary statements about one side or the
other do not necessarily indicate lack of impartiality. 3 Nor is, "Bias ...
established simply by showing the ALJ favored one party's witnesses
11 The hearing officer's response to counsel's vexatious attitude was not only
justified, but entirely proper. Roland M. v. Concord School Committee, 910 F.2d 983, 997 (1st
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 912 (1991).
12 See, 29 C.F.R. §§102.35, 102.64(a) (1987) (duty to enquire fully into "the facts"
or "all matters and issues"); NLRB v. Overseas Motors, Inc., 818 F.2d 517, 520 (6th Cir.1987)
(A.L.J. can interrupt or question witness to clarify testimony); N.L.R.B. v. Baddour, Inc., 848
F.2d 193, (6th Cir. 1988) (Table), 1988 WL 49075 , cert. denied, 488 U.S. 944 (1988).
13 "The ALl simply stated... that Mr. Taylor's professional conduct as an attorney
before the AJ had always been of the 'highest caliber.' This is not the type of statement that
demonstrates judicial prejudice." Chaney Creek Coal Corp. v. Federal Mine Safety & Health
Review, 866 F.2d 1424, 1432 (D.C.Cir. 1989).
over the other party's witnesses."'
' 4
The possession of, and explicit statement of a particular policy
position on the law is not inconsistent with impartiality. In one case a
hearing officer had extensively published on the theory of punishment,
which then became the basis of an attack on his "bias." The Sixth
Circuit rejected this attack, stating, "It may be sound advice to all
judges and judicial officers to be as temperate as possible when
rendering decisions. It would, however, be a great disservice to imply
that a vigorous expression of views on a subject appropriately before
the tribunal can become evidence of judicial bias."'5
Thus statements and questions posed by an ALJ merit great
latitude, since they, like judges are similarly placed, often in the midst
of the heated caldron of litigation. That does not mean, however, that
there are no limits on what the ALJ may say or do.
For example, some conduct, such as the continued presence of
corrections officers in the hearing room throughout the hearing,
including after the hearing was concluded but before the decision was
determined, raises serious constitutional questions.1 6 Such presence
may create "an unacceptable risk of unfairness."' 7 Similarly, following
a reluctant witness to a parking lot, persuading them to come back and
promising a limitation on questioning was inappropriate conduct."8
Similarly, statements such as recognition by a hearing officer
that a "wrong decision" might have adverse funding implications for an
agency (in the form of a cut off of federal highway money to the
agency) sufficiently conveyed the appearance of pressure against the
state and required reversal. 19 Neither can one condone a statement prior
to the defense putting on its case that the defendant was guilty of a
traffic offense, and that all the hearing was about was whether there
14 Impact Industries, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 847 F.2d 379, 381 (7th Cir., 1988). See also,
Colfor Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 838 F.2d 164, 168(6th Cir.1988) (rejecting an attack on an AJ
because of "unnecessarily disparaging descriptions of [defendant's] actions" and [the AU's]
"emotional" and "vituperative" discussion of the impasse issue, when such views were acquired
during the course of the hearing and not extrajudici ally).
15 Garver v. U.S., 846 F.2d 1029, 1031 (6th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 820
(1988).
16 Moore v. Scully, 90 Civ. 3817, 1993 WL 22129 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).17 Giano v. Sullivan, 709 F.Supp. 1209, 1216 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
18 Korunka v. Department of Children and Family Services, 259 Ill.App.3d 527,530,
631 N.E.2d 759, 761, 197 II1.Dec.537, 539 (Ill.App. 4 Dist. 1994).
19 In re Jack O'Lantern, Inc., 118 N.H. 445, 387 A.2d 1166 (N.H. 1978).
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were any mitigating circumstances.2 °
In general, however, AU questioning is permissible, just as is
similar questioning by judges.21 Problems most frequently arise when
questioning becomes overly extensive or overly aggressive but modest
questioning presents no difficulty. For example, the Arizona Court of
Appeals found no problem with hearing officer questions that occupied
16 of 225 pages of transcript (7 percent) of a hearing.22 Nor was a
single question line improper suggesting that a particular document had
neither been admitted nor disclosed to the opposing side.23
However, a tribunal's partiality was suspect when nearly half
the questions asked were asked by the hearing officer, as well as
because the questions were misleading and confusing. 24 Moreover, the
questioning at times "approximated adversarial cross examination. 25
Since both parties were represented by able counsel who were capable
of presenting and developing the positions of their respective clients
such intervention was particularly inappropriate.26  Similarly, in
another case rigorous cross examination, including clear attempts to
discredit testimony and secure admission of wrongdoing, stepped over
the line.27 In contrast, questioning has been approved which was
described as vigorous in driving for specifics, but not to the point of
20 Eilers v. District of Columbia Bureau of Motor Vehicles Servs., 583 A.2d 677,
686-88 (D.C. 1990). In Eilers, the hearing examiner, "announced that he was 'convinced' that
Mr. Eilers had committed a traffic violation," before the defense testimony was presented, and
he then asked if there was anything "in mitigation" before the defense had an opportunity to
argue the merits.
21 Burhoe v. Whaland, 116 N.H. 222, 225, 356 A.2d 658, 659 (N.H. 1976); State
v. Davis, 83 N.H. 435, 436, 144 A. 124, 125 (N.H. 1928); 3 J. Wigmore, EVIDENCE § 784
(Chadbourn rev. 1970). A bar association trial committee did not violate due process
requirements or statutory requirements by questioning witnesses, or by indicating that if it felt
the need, it would call independent witnesses. In re Cornelius, 520 P.2d 76 (Alaska 1974).
22 Turf Paradise, Inc. v. Arizona Racing Commission, 160 Ariz. 241, 245, 772 P.2d
595, 599 (Ariz. App. Div. 2 1989). Only three of seven witnesses who testified were
questioned by the hearing officer.
23 Ford v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 145 Ariz. 593, 599, 703 P.2d 537, 543
(Ariz. App. Div. 1, 1984), approved in part, vacated in unrelated part, 145 Ariz. 509, 703 P.2d
453 (Ariz. 1985).
24 Kosik v. Industrial Commission, 125 Ariz. 535, 611 P.2d 122 Ariz. (App. Div 2
1980).
25 Id. at 125 Ariz. 538, 611 P.2d at 125. The questions also presented problems in
form.
26 id.
27 Burhoe v. Whaland, 116 N.H. 222, 223, 356 A.2d 658, 659 (N.H. 1976).
being overzealous, badgering or reflecting bias.28
Abuse of position by the ALJ obviously should be avoided,
particularly action that can be characterized as intimidating. For
example in Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 903-4 (3rd. Cir. 1995) the
court described the AL's actions as follows:
The ALJ continued to intimidate claimant's
representative:
ALJ: ... I'm not trying to hurt Mr. Ventura, but you're
not doing one damn thing to help him. So why don't you sit
back and listen for a second.
The representative agreed to provide the ALJ with
whatever information he wanted from the veterans' hospital and
presented the ALJ with detailed information concerning
claimant's visits to the veterans' hospital. However, the ALl
further reprimanded claimant's representative when he
attempted to question the medical expert on the stand.
AL: First of all, you're trying to knock out evidence
that's favorable to Mr. Ventura. So wake up and smell the roses
on this case. His problem lies in the emotional area.
Claimant's representative again attempted to question
the expert concerning the physical causes of claimant's back
pain and again the ALJ reprimanded the representative
preventing this line of questioning.
AL: Why are you reading this to death when I said that
primarily if he's got this emotional condition as the VA Center
seems to think he has, it's going to be beneficial to him? Why
are you trying to kill this thing on the physical when it's not
going to matter to him?
The ALJ's continuous interference with the
representative's introduction of evidence of the physical causes
of claimant's back pain violated the ALJ's duty to develop the
record fully and fairly to consider seriously the findings of a
treating physician. (citations omitted)
28 Corn., Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. County Com'rs, 45 Pa. Cmwlth. 102,
107, 405 A.2d 577,579 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1979).
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Nor is it improper to limit questions that attorneys seek to ask,
at least so long as the questions themselves are in fact improper.29 The
fact that an attorney and the hearing officer "clashed, sometimes
bitterly, over rulings that the hearing officer made during the course of
the hearing" does not in itself indicate prejudgment of the case or
inability to fairly render a decision.30 However, it is worth noting that
an invitation to submit a post hearing brief, with an indication that the
plaintiff's position would be seriously considered, was treated as
significant by the court.3' As a practical matter, allowing a party to
make such submissions serves two serious functions. If the ALJ has
erred, it gives the ALJ an opportunity to correct herself. Alternatively,
failure to utilize such an offer is likely to be viewed as waiver on any
appeal. Similarly, failure to recall witnesses to address questions posed
by an ALJ may be construed against a party.32
Of course, failure to permit appropriate cross examination
constitutes reversible error.33 Care should obviously be exercised in
preventing an attorney from asking questions. Indeed, it is often the
case that it might be better to permit an improper question or two to be
asked and answered than to spend substantial time at a hearing debating
with counsel the appropriateness of particular questions. Indeed, unless
the attorney's questions are clearly irrelevant, precluded by controlling
law, designed to prolong the hearing or for some other improper
purpose, such as treading upon important areas of privilege, the harm
in permitting such questions is likely to be minimal, whereas the risk of
reversal and additional expense and time is such that it isn't worth a
29 Mont v. Chater, 114 F.3d 1191, 1997 WL 201626 at *11 (7th Cir. 1997) (Table).
30 Bostrom v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 1997 WL 242889 at *2 (Conn.
Super, 1997).
31 Id.
32 Bickham v. Selcke, 216 Ill.App.3d 453, 461, 576 N.E.2d 975, 979, 160 Ill.Dec.
21, 25) (Ill.App. 1 Dist. 1991) ("Plaintiff had the option of recalling ... witnesses to elicit any
further information which plaintiff deemed helpful or necessary to his defense and of filing
motions to strike any alleged improper questions or answers brought out during direct
examination." Three board members and the hearing officer had questioned two witnesses.)
33 Bostrom, 1997 WL242889 at *3. The hearing officer prohibited the plaintiff's
attorney from cross examination on the reliability of the particular Intoxilyzer machine
employed in the case.
fight to keep such questions out. 4
Certain types of questions appear to be lightening rods for
objections if posed by an AU, particularly with counsel representing a
claimant or party present in the hearing. For example, federal social
security ALJs have been frequently criticized for inadequate
hypothetical questions,35 ofttimes with allegations that the question was
"misleading, biased and incomplete in that it fails to present ... a full
picture of [the claimant's] impairment."36 However, omissions of
characteristics from a hypothetical question because the AU determines
that such matters have not been demonstrated to be relevant, does not
invalidate a question.37 Moreover, the presence of the claimant's
attorney who could have presented additional questions has been
construed to mean that failure to do so waives any error.38 The law is
clear that failure to include significant limitations in a hypothetical
question invalidates any response to the question.39
34 An offer of proof that is included in the record may cure any potential error on
appeal. See, Erickson v. Aaron's Automotive Products, Inc., 967 S.W.2d 661, 664 (Mo.App.
1998).
35 Since hypothetical questions often go to the heart of disputed issues, and the
answers are often outcome determinative, such questions are obvious targets for dispute.
36 Mont v. Chater, 114 F.3d 1191, 1997 WL 201626, at * 8 (7th Cir. 1997) (Table).37 Id. Accord, Pertuis v. Apfel, 152 F.3d 1006, 1007 (8th Cir. 1998) ( "The AU
based his hypothetical question upon those limitations which he found to be credible and
supported by the evidence."); Ehrhart v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 969 F.2d
534, 540 (7th Cir. 1992); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 756 (9th Cir. 1989),
("Hypothetical questions posed to the vocational expert must set out all the limitations and
restrictions of the particular claimant.... For reasons already given, the restrictions contained
in the ALJ's hypothetical based on Dr. Auerbach's report are amply supported by the record,
and therefore the AU properly relied on Dr. Meadow's testimony in determining Magallanes's
residual functional capacity."); Brown v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 361, 363 (10th Cir.1986); Lasirona
v. Apfel, 1998 WL410895, at *3, 57 Soc.Sec.Rep.Ser. 147 (N.D.Cal. Jul 17, 1998) (Proper
to exclude Dr's conclusions from hypothetical question because the AU "believed the [Dr's]
report was obtained specifically to support plaintiffs claim for disability, and because the
report was not supported by sufficient underlying findings to overcome other evidence and
establish limitations that preclude medium work.")
38 Lasirona v. Apfel, at * 9.
39 Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 218 (3rd Cir. 1984) ("These impairments,
dizziness and blurred vision, are medically undisputed and could seriously affect appellant's
ability to engage in alternative employment. The AU did not mention these problems in his
question, referring instead to 'a history of treatment for a variety of impairments.' In our view,
the fact that these conditions were not included in the hypothetical question rendered that
question defective, and thus the expert's answer cannot be considered substantial evidence."
Ledoux v. Schweiker, 732 F.2d 1385, 1388 (8th Cir.1984)) ("Hypothetical question [that]
failed to consider the drowsiness and daytime sleep requirements of the appellant, his
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XVIII Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 408
Proper questions framed by the AJ, however, are a significant
aid to decisionmaking.40 "Hypothetical questions posed to vocational
experts should precisely set out the claimant's particular impairments.
Greene v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 99, 101 (8th Cir.1991). However, 'a
proper hypothetical question "is sufficient if it sets forth the
impairments which are accepted as true by the AL.m'
4
Difficulties with hypothetical questions are not limited to
federal ALJs for similar issues arise in state cases such as workers
compensation cases.42 The remedy of cross examination, however, is
also recognized as a cure for problems whether they be inclusion or
omission of facts from hypothetical questions. 43 Similar deference may
borderline or defective IQ, his anxiety syndrome and his allegations of pain," was improper.);
Cripe v. Apfel, --- F.Supp.2d ----- 1998 WL 656572 at *6 (N.D.Iowa July 8, 1998) (" A review
of the AU's decision shows that the AU selectively quoted from Dr. Brooks' treatment notes,
isolating any statement that minimized the plaintiffs condition. A review of the treatment notes
themselves shows a staggering combination of patient complaints and objectively verifiable
symptoms. From January 3, 1992 to August 27, 1993, Dr. Brooks, a specialist in the diagnosis
and treatment of rheumatoid arthritis, recorded and treated tenderness, pain and/or swelling
in the plaintiffs hands, wrists, elbows, shoulders, neck, back, hips, knees, ankles, feet and jaws.
On three occasions during the course of his treatment, Dr. Brooks set physical limitations for
the plaintiff, each more stringent than the last. Dr. Brooks treated the plaintiff for over two
years and examined her on at least eight occasions before giving the opinions in the November
1994 questionnaire. The court finds that those opinions are supported by the record. Dr.
Brooks' assessment of the three omitted impairments is consistent with the medical evidence
in the record. Accordingly, Dr. Brooks' opinions should have been given controlling weight
and all impairments identified by Dr. Brooks should have been included in any hypothetical
question relied upon by the AJ. Because the AU's first hypothetical question did not
completely describe the plaintiffs impairments, it was improper and could not serve as
substantial evidence in the AU's decision.") See also Rosario v. Shalala, 836 F.Supp. 257,
262(E.D.Pa. 1993) ("ALJ's hypothetical question failed to contain pertinent findings made by
the ALJ about Rosario's limitations."); Hedstrom v. Sullivan, 783 F.Supp. 553,
557(D.Colo.1992) ("[Tihe AU told the vocational expert to assume that plaintiffs visual
impairment would not significantly reduce her vocational potential and that her vision was
sufficient for the vast majority of jobs existing in the national economy. He also told the expert
to assume that claimant did not have problems with blurring and that she did not have to hold
a page within an inch of her face to read. Finally, he told the expert to ignore plaintiffs
complaints of aching, throbbing, and tearing in her eyes after 30 minutes of use. None of these
assumptions in the hypothetical question are supported by substantial evidence in the record.")
40 Haynes v. Shalala, 26 F.3d 812, 815 (8th Cir.1994) (in posing hypothetical
questions to a vocational expert, an AU need only include those impairments believed to be
true).
41 Hoetling v. Chater, 1996 WL 204336 at *9 (E.D.Mo. 1996).
42 Noblesville Casting Div. of TRW, Inc. v. Prince, 438 N.E.2d 722, 728 (Ind. 1982).
41 Id. at 737. "In Dahlberg v. Ogle, 268 Ind. 30, 373 N.E.2d 159 (1978), this Court
held that hypothetical questions are not improper merely because facts pertinent to the evidence
are omitted since a remedy is available via cross-examination."
be accorded state hearing officers in determining what facts should be
included in a hypothetical question."
Challenges have also been raised to ALJs questioning a
potential expert witness on voir dire to qualify the witness as an
expert.45 Such challenges are likely to be rejected, for as a practical
matter, someone must determine whether a proffered expert witness
qualifies as such. To bar an ALJ from voir dire inquiry, risks a
determination at the decision stage that no competent expert testimony
had been presented, surely a nonsensical result if capable of being
avoided during the hearing by additional questions and/or submission
of an alternative expert witness.
Objections may be made to imprecise phrasing, 46 such as of a
hypothetical question, but such errors also may be cured by the AILJ
subsequently indicating understanding of the correct state of the law.
47
On occasion, a hearing officer might even herself call a witness and
question them. Such action has been held permissible.48
Besides the requirements of due process, other provisions such
as state constitutions or codes of judicial or administrative conduct may
also constrain an AL's actions.49 Such alternative bases for analysis
appear to be rarely cited. In one such case the Louisiana Constitution
44 Ohio State Medical Bd. v. Zwick, 59 Ohio App.2d 133, 142, 392 N.E.2d 1276,
1282 (Ohio App. 1978).
45 Fay-Ray Corp. v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Com'n, 959 S.W.2d 362, 367-68
(Tex.App. 1998) (permission for commission to ask leading questions also not error).
46 Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Board of Review of Indus. Com'n, 839 P.2d
841, 845-46 (Utah App. 1992)(imprecise phrasing).
41 Id. at 846.
48 Toro Development Co. v. Com., Dept. of Environmental Resources, 56 Pa.
Cmwlth. 471,481 n. 16, 425 A.2d 1163, 1168 (Pa. Cmwth. 1981).
49 Some examples of such authority include:
ABA Informal Op. 87-1524. (1987) A judge is not disqualified from presiding at a
trial solely because of a former association in private practice more than two years previously
with counsel for a party. This decision construed and applied Canon 3C(1) of the Code of
Judicial Conduct which states as a general standard that: "[a] judge should disqualify himself
in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned."
ABA Informal Op. 1477 (1981) A judge must recuse himself or herself from
adjudicating cases in which a litigant is represented by the judge's own attorney, whether the
lawyer is representing the judge in a personal matter or in a matter pertaining to the judge's
official position or conduct, subject to the rule of necessity.
OH Adv. Op. 91-13 (1991). A judge should disqualify himself from a proceeding
when his impartiality might reasonably be questioned and or when he has personal bias or
prejudice toward a witness including such witnesses as a person who had engaged in marital
counseling with respect to the judge and his wife.
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was cited as well as the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure as bases for
barring the Director of a Department of Environmental Quality from
conducting a hearing when the Director had prior to taking his current
position acted as a consultant to a group which opposed similar
facilities.5 In addition, the Director had apparently discussed the
substance of the matter with staff prior to the hearing commencing.5
SUGGESTIONS:
In short, an ALJ has a fair degree of latitude to ask questions.
In doing so, however, it would be well to consider the following
suggestions:
1. Particularly when a party is represented by an attorney, ask a
minor question early to clarify a point that has been made by a question
to a witness. By doing so the ALJ establishes firm control of the
hearing, and sends an overt message to both sides, you have to persuade
me with the testimony; lack of clarity does not help.
2. When both sides are present through attorneys, ask questions
to clarify matters when both attorneys are questioning witnesses. This
conveys an appearance of impartiality and mitigates potential attacks.
3. When either attorney makes a valid objection, rule in their
favor. When either attorney makes an incompetent or improper
objection, rule just as impartially against them.
4. Utilize care when posing outcome determinative questions,
such as hypothetical questions. However, when you are convinced that
the evidence does not support inclusion of something in an hypothetical
question, do not include that element in the question. The courts will
back you up on appeal. However, permit an attorney to ask a modified
question, including the element you omitted, so the answer is in the
record. On the other hand, when deciding the case you are free to
disregard the answer to the attorney's hypothetical question. If the
attorney declines to ask any variant question, that failure may be a
waiver for any possible appeal.
5. Attempt to eliminate "tones" of anger, hostility, aggression,
contempt, and the like from questions. However, be aware that the
courts have been quite tolerant of such tones when they are well earned
'0 In the Matter of American Waste and Pollution Control Co., 581 So.2d 738, 745-
47 (La. Aw. 1 Cir. 1991).
Id. at 745.
by litigants or their attorneys and that fact appears on the face of the
record.
6. Avoid if possible questions that again and again reflect such
tones and appear to bore in on one side only. Too many questions may
itself become problematical.
7. Avoid comments before the end of the hearing that are
outcome determinative, such as "the accused is obviously guilty," the
agency cannot tolerate an acquittal, or it would cost the agency money
if it doesn't prevail. Such comments detract from the appearance of
impartiality and are likely to produce reversals.
8. Offer when possible the opportunity to supplement material
in the record with post hearing briefs. In only a few cases will this
likely be taken up. If not, the matters will be considered waived on
appeal. Moreover, such offers convey the appearance of fairness.
9. Do not feel constrained against a voir dire of a potential
expert witness if you believe the qualifications of the witness are
unclear. Since parts of their testimony may be particularly critical to
the case before you, such voir dire may be an important guard to the
ultimate validity of any final decision.
10. If you are required to decide the case immediately after the
hearing, clear the room out of everyone connected to the parties while
you deliberate and/or devise your opinion. This avoids the possibility
of improper ex parte contact during the most sensitive part of the case
from the viewpoint of litigants. The appearance of impartiality at this
point is particularly critical.
11. If you are convinced that there is critical evidence that has
not been presented, and that some witness or document may be
available that can shed light on the matter, do not hesitate to order a
continuance for the purpose of receiving more testimony or such
documents. This assumes of course, that you have the power to order
such continuances, and can receive post hearing evidence. If need be,
call and questions a witness yourself, allowing of course the
opportunity to cross examine the witness to either side. If a written
submission is elicited, make certain that each side has an opportunity
to respond.
12. Be yourself. If you are confused by the record, chances are
any reviewing court would share that confusion. It is your job to clear
it up, even if it means stepping on sensitive attorney toes. Reviewing
courts are more likely to appreciate your efforts to produce clarity, than
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to castigate and reverse your honest attempts at conducting a proper
hearing.
CONCLUSION:
The AL acts today under multiple constraints far different from
those of a common law judge in the past. She is certainly constrained
by the due process clause but the clause itself has far broader scope than
it used to have. "The due process clauses come from English
jurisprudence, which had a simple rule: 'a judge was disqualified for
direct pecuniary interest and for nothing else.' ' 52 Still, reported case
decisions strongly indicate that ALJs are accorded substantial deference
for a broad range of conduct, including situations in which they
sometimes become quite vigorous questioners.53
52 See concurring opinion by Judge Easterbrook in Del Vecchio v. Illinois Dept. of
Corrections, 31 F.3d 1363, 1389, 1390 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1037
(1995).
53 See, Broida, A GUIDE TO MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD LAW & PRACTICE
MSPBG CH 3, IV, "Although the case did not involve an administrative judge, the discussion
in Chocallo v. SSA, DHEW, I MSPR 605, 2 MSPB 23 (1980) (ALJ Decision), involving
removal of a SSA AUJ, includes considerable commentary on the type of conduct that will
subject an adjudicator to a well-founded allegation of bias and inappropriate behavior during
the conduct of a case. Examples in the discussion include refusal to permit a party's counsel
a reasonable opportunity to question witnesses, questioning by the adjudicator of a client
concerning matters protected by the attorney-client privilege, disparagement of counsel during
the hearing and in a written opinion, and curt, impatient and domineering behavior by a judge
toward counsel. See Matosian v. Dept. of Air Force, 56 MSPR 689, 696 (1993) ('Even
assuming that the appellant is correct in arguing that the administrative judge's demeanor was
occasionally impatient or unpleasant, such behavior does not, in itself, constitute bias.')."
